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Seated.government policy in Zimbabwe has three•explicit objectives.
firstly there is the need to repair the physical infrastructure damaged or _■ 
destroyed during the independence' war and to resettle' the low-income refugees , 
from that wax. . Secondly, skilled manpower needs to be trained or recruited 
to replace the huifiAn"capital' "drained 'from the nation in the .past few years.
Finally, the unbalanced agricultural sector that evolved under successive..
Rhodesian governments needs urgent' overhauling if it is <io continuet'ta play 
its part in the development of the country. This last task is both the most 
. expensive and the most explosive. .At the 1981-ZIMCORD conference, some 
. Z$8Q0 million out if.a total development budget^of $1,2 billion was.pledged 
to agricultural-developmmJ- and land redistribution (Economist, 1,981)-.'
The policies that are formulated and! their method of implementation will be.' '
decisive in determining the future^viability of.the.agricultural industries 
of Zimbabwe. In this paper,' agricultural .polices'in-, Zimbabwe and elsewhere is-' ( 
examined in order to provide some'initial guidance as to appropriate future '•
■ policies for this countryj The ideas expressed here are only a start in the 
long -haul towards an equitable society. Much'else will remain for further- ' 
sighted and more imaginative workers to elucidate. . -
\ Today,, approximately 6. milTion of the 7,5 million people of Zimbabwe'
live in the countryside. Most inhabit areas that are overcrowded and. of lew;- 
■agricultural potential. The main infrastructure of the country (banks, all-weather 
.. reads, clinics and schools) is remote from the'bulk ef the rural people. The 
distance is not only physical, but also in terms of the experience of the people 
themselves. A farmer who has to travel 200 kilometres by bus to deposit his 
marketing board cheque into his own bank account, only to be told to wait ]
fourteen days until it can be. turned into cash, may probably never “fully comprehend 
the service that banking institutions can render. Yet included-amongst the 
rural dwellers of this country are a small group of some 6,500 commercial farmers 
who occupy approximately'half4the agricultural land. Their farms, lie on the 
best third of tne agricultural soil of Zimbabwe and are well -served by. the - 
infrastructure necessary to.- a modern economy. ■ •
There are those to-whom the solution to Zimbabwe's 'agricultural development 
is straightforward; it'is a simple exercise'in land redistribution. To those 
who understand the land and'its people, the situation is .more complex. -The . 
commercial farmers produce-some 94%  of marketed agricultural output and support 
directly approximately 1,8 million Zimbabweans. By contrast, the remaining'. 
farming areas produce only some 15% of the total measured agricultural output, 
while providing at-least subsistence for■ about 4,-5 million people ('C.S.O. July, 
October and December, 19801. 'Zimbabwe has one of the fastest population growth 
rates in the world (doubling !the to:tal every 20 years). The country clearly 
cannot afford agricultural policies'which hinder food production. Moreover, 
agriculture plays a-major role in.the overall economy. The agricultural, industries . 
accounted for 14% of gross domestic product in 1978 (Reserve, Bank, 1980). ‘
Exports of agricultural commodities accounted for 45% of total exports while 
agricultural imports were only 2% of the total.import bill (C.S.O., September, 198p)i
Zimbabwe is not a typical developing country. It has a strong mixed 
economy and is unusually well—endewed with much of the fundamental structure 
necessary for development, , Yet this economy has an evident dual nature, a fact 
which is epitomised by the agricultural sector.- The poverty and ecological 
- degradation of the peasant farming areas are in stark contrast to the prosperity 
and sophistication of the commercial lands. A primary goal-of agricultural 
, development must be to reduce the divergence in income distribution, resource 
availability and productivity between the peasant and the- commercial areas. To... 
achieve this-, it is necessafy first to have some understanding of the agricultural 
history of this country.- ' A- A
\
2The period from first European settlement in. .1896 to the present 
has seen massive changes in national farming patterns. . This transition has been 
documented in a variety, of sources (Muir, (1981) has .produced a very, valuable 
and comprehensive review of both literature and data available). - ;
The nation, from being an obscure and unimportant outpost of the 
British Empire',' has grown into a major agricultural nation, both on a regional 
and international scale. Arable farming has become increasingly dominated by 
maize and tobacco (although diversification during the UDI era has modified this 
pattern). Farmers have developed marketing arrangements to remove some of the 
uncertainty of production, particularly with regard to ppice. The divergence 
between the peasant and commercial sectors, although apparent soon after 
European settlement, became of major significance by the start of World-War II.
The commercial farmers, with their dominant political influence, have always; been 
in a position to evolve policies, which favoured the development of their sector.
For example, ownership of land was on a racially segregated basis until recently.
The peasant sector, by contrast, has become progressively disadvantaged as time 
has passed. While there have.been,attempts to improve the welfare of the peasant 
producer, these have been largely offset by the scarcity of papital, trained 
manpower, infrastructure and.research facilities which tend to be concentrated 
in the commercial sector.- It .is important to appreciate that the peasant 
farmers,are not inherently conservative or resistant tp change. They have ■
.sfiown themselves (as have similar groups elsewhere on this planet) competent, and 
willing to use new technology when it suits.their needs. The rapid uptake of,the 
' animal'drawn plough, which, relieved the-major constraint of labour, well 
illustrates this point. Market incentives■have .also been shown to have a significant 
effect on peasant production..These facts .will be considered in more detail later,
:i I , ■»It is my belief that the early 1940's were a watershed in the agri- 
„ cultural development of this country, ..By then, Zimbabwe had become an
agricultural trading nation, with tobacco and maize being the main commodities 
exported. These were largely produced by the-commercial sector and the foreign ex-r 
change earned by agricultural' trade had become.of^major importance to the- nation’s, 
economy. .These facts were, to mean, in the years following World War II,
-, increasingly favourable treatment for the. comme.rcia,l sectorJ the peasant farming - 
sector failed to move significantly beyond.subsistence.production. The development 
of Zimbabwe, with scarce capital resources-.and limited mineral potential, required 
an export-orientated agriculture',. The first 40 'years ef the twentieth century, 
with two world wars and a major international depression, were difficult for 
a young country attempting to establish itself in world agricultural markets.
. . In. easier times, the peasant sector might have developed, more effectively in 
spite of- its disadvantaged position. .The regality is that the increasing need 
of .the country for foreign exchange and for large marketable surpluses to . .
develop, secondary industries, resulted in -policies which favoured'commercial- 
■/ agriculture. The .peasant sector, where investment returns were slower, tended
to be ignored. These policies, initiated in the parly-years of Rhodesia’s history, 
quickly became part ox the structure .of. Zimbabwean agriculture and were to' 
p continue, unaltered in substance,- apart from thq;'introduction'of measures
for soil conservation, from the 1940's until 1940. The■foundation for the , 
social, ecological and agricultural problems of the peasant farming areas 
was firmly laid, by 1-940. These -last points-require emphasis,. The. agricultural 
policies of the last 40 (wpro were forged in jai earlier era of widespread 
international insecurity. .They were the policies of ,a small highly-motivated 
group -in .an undeveloped country struggling in an adverse economic environment.
It would.be reasonable, to .expect, that as international economic conditions 
turned favourable in the .years following World War.-II and as • the nation 
entered, a time pf. considerable, relative prosperity., ..that - more broadly-based '--q,nd 
- equitable 'policies would supplant the social Darwinism .of the. pre-1940's.- --.It-is 
no less than a national tragedy that this evolution never took place. The 
final. 40--years of the-history of-Rhodesia-saw the slow fossilisation and 'eventual
collapse oi c.uracaJ. curai policy iVr peasant sector since that policy no 
longer reflected the realities of the country side.
While understanding the past .can lead to' future improvements, dwelling 
on the past contributes little.' The reality today is that.‘there is one..sector 
of agriculture which is efficient,' prosperous, productive, but'numerically... 
small. On the-other hand, the bulk of rural dwellers have’largely been by-- ■ 
passed by development and in consequence nearly half the area.of Zimbabwe 
is rapidly becoming useless for anything, much less agriculture. Zimbabwe . 
is not unique in this regard and we can ■"'bviously learn much from understanding 
not only local but.also overseas experience. In this regard, the Indian 
experience is particularly relevant.^
■ . ’ ’ . \ *
India is the home' of seme 67O 'million people with an average pgr '•
capita income of US$200 per annum. Modern. India came into existence in an 
'even more violent fashion than.Zimbabwe. 'The 1940's saw massive communal. - .
violence following religious' clashes that killed probably half a million , ■
people in six weeks. Religious;, tribal, caste and,'.linguistic rivalries w , 
continue to threaten its national stability. Population’growth is still top- 
high for the resources of the country although.’it has ea-eod'in recent years.
The 1981 census will probably show that about 160 million people survive on< . 
farms too Small to provide a subsistence living. Another 120 million have 
no land at all; both group:• ’ t c - m a k e  up.40$ ’of India's population. By ' 
contrast 15% of the land-owning households own some 45% of the land. At 
independence, India faced the same two critical issues that confront Zimbabwe.
Pood production was a vital and immediate need while the long-term stability 
•f the country demanded resource, and particularly land, redistribution. Taken, 
simultaneously and with equal emphasis, land redistribution:and food security, 
were irreconcilable policies.. The’ Indians chose an immediate and intensive 
■policy of encouraging food production while aiming,- in the longer term, to 
selve the distribution problem. , ’
V  1 . ' - - - - ■ ” ' %i The consequence has been an agricultural success story that has
confounded the experts. For the first twenty years folic wing independent,
India imported, on average, 5% of its grain requirements. By contrast, 
after, a-severe draught and consequent poor harvest, in the 19 7-9 / 90 season, 
the country reached the subsequent harvest still holding stocks of 14 million. ■ 
tonnes of its own grain. No imports' were needed. Predictions for the I98O/.8I 
season are for-a grain crop in' excess of ljl'million tonnes and the new 
sixth plan , (-which runs to 1985) envisages output rising to 145 million tonnes.
This success is one of productivity, not one of expansion of ploughed land.-.
Yields per hectare have .Increased on'average about'.3% per’annum in-'the last >
15' years while the ^ annual-increase in area ploughed has been .less than 1%.
India's agricultural transformation has been phenomenal. Today, land 
reform remains a'smouldering, but not- insoluble- issue.’in India's agricultural . 
development. The problems associated-with-this'longer term policy remain tf 
be resolved and are outside the scope of this paper,." The point at' issue 
ib 'that successful and significant-agricultural development has taken place, 
in a society where there exist vast'differences in income, wealth and access 
to land. It'has conie about" for two reasons. . Firstly,'the political issues 
•f redistribution 'have been disentangled as far as practical from the., agricultural 
issues of production, '.ohcondiy,." agricultural policy has been based firmly on 
practical- knowledge of the .Indian farmer ’and. of l?is economic,' social and 
technological environment. ' Farming 'practices, technologies' and policies have been, 
devised to alleviate the real constraints facing the agricultural producer.
This’ c'ohtrasts sharply with the, -situation in much of Africa where scientists 
have tended to concentrate on the improvement of exotic farming practices, 
introduced for the commercial:; farming'sector. The farming systems of peasant 
producers and the reasons for theii existence have been almost totally ignored’, 
by agricultural scientists. ' . ' ,d . . .” .. . ,:
1. Much of the information in this section of' th# paper id. derived frero
"India 1 Treadmill or-Take-off - A Survey", The Economist, March 28, 1981.
4:Spme'examples m-a"y assist to-.illustrate, the Indian approach. Credit 
was identified as a major need for-'Indian small-scale farmers.< .A policy of 
providing credit through rural cooperatives was then introduced. Consequently, 
in the twenty years from 1951 to 1971» rural credit cjl-operatives expanded from 
supplying a mere 3*1% of India's“agricultural credit to 22,7%. Rural money­
lenders share of the credit market'fell'fr^m 75*2% to 49>6%. In Punjab today, 
there is a co-operative credit association in every village. To force banks 
into agricultural lending, they were nationalised in 1969* By 1985* 16% 
qf all bank lending should be in agriculture (up from 12% in 1979). At least 
half of these loans must be directed at the disadvantaged farmers in the 
community. Incidentally, this contrasts with the situation in Zimbabwe .where 
Commercial'banks are almost totally absent from the peasant farming areas, even ' 
to the rn.st wealthy. Sanyati, for example,, has a growing business centre, the 
nearby TILCOR estate, the relatively prosperous Copper .Queen .Purchase’.Area and 
Gokwe Tribal Trust Land. This last'district alone will probably market $20 million 
of crops in 1981 yet no-bank has seen fit to send even a mobile unit into'. the 
' area. *
.Other needs, too, are carefully .identified and programmes- devised to 
overcome them.- Punjab 'Agricultural University is a world leader in the 
development of Third World agriculture. 'Agricultural extension is based on 
frequent visits by practically experienced advisors. Marketing of inputs and 
outputs has been put'on"an honest and reliable basis.
The remarkable thing about the revolution in Indian agriculture is that 
it is based'on such simple principles. The’problems of development in India 
make Zimbabwe's difficulties seem trivial. Yet by the careful and reasoned 
application of well-known remedies, Indian agriculture has, in an.amazingly 
shdct period of time, ’’evolved £o a ‘stage where that country can consistently: 
be self-sufficient’in grains ..and ev'ejn. produce a surplus for- export.. Herein 
' lies.the..message'fhr Zimbabwe. Schultz, (1980)., write's: ....
."According to biblical' law, being rich maizes it.hard .to get into 
■' heaven.'--.The. corresponding law.in economics is: Being’rich makes
. it hard to comprehend khe economic'.behaviour, of people in .low income . 
r- countries,.. ,v.. I have also argued that our studies of the economic 
. dynamics ..of low income countries ^ have suffered from several ....
intellectual mistakes.. The major mistake has been the presumption , 
that standard economic theory is inadequate and that a different 
theory is needed........The received core of economic theory is
. fully’as.applicable to the scarcity problems that confront low income 
countries as ’to. - the 'corresponding problems of high income countries. *
, , . /mother mistake is to neglect what can be learned from the economic 
history of Western Europe-during-the centuries when most .-people on'
.that'continent were poor. Still ..another mistake is to give too little 
- ' , ■, ^ attention to the economic behaviour of famp families, especially, as ..„ 
they opt for improvements in education and wealth - the so-called 
contribution to the. stock of human capital." >
; T'his is the root cause of the stagnation of Rhodesian agricultural 
'policy between,1948 and 1980. Policy-was set for the commercial.sector.
Where the peasant farmers failed to respond to .this policy, the reason was 
r attributed to the fact that peasants were motivated in a totally different 
fashion,.to the.commercial producer. -. Administrators failed to comprehend 
ythaj; ^ policy, ..as-perceived by the peas ant ...farmer, might' be very different- 
■’ froig that which : was intended. .The -outcome has been a series ; of ill-founded, 
and-misleading myths-regarding the peasant producer. An example.is the belief 
' that peasants have a 'target' income; once they.achieve this, they cease t* 
___work until _their... money is. exhausted..-,..In the current season some commercial,.
/farmers have used this “to explain' the shortage of cotton pickers. At the 
present rate, cf pay of Jc. per kil" o£ cotton picked, it has been said that 
the picker can achieve his or her target income too quickly.. The reality is that 
. peasant cottar .growers employing casual labour, pay 5c to 8c :per"Zcil*. * :Not 
surprisingly,, pickers,^end to stay in' their own .areas and earn a higher, wage.
The peasant, farmer does respond to -the same' economic stimuli that motivate-us 
all. The problem has been the inability of policy'makers to comprehend the 
economics of agriculture'.from, the perspective of a .family living-close to 
the poverty. line. . , . ,
.1 shall. illustrate- this further by using a recent and most relevant-' 
example., .- Concern has been voiced at the dec-line of {Zimbabwe ' s beef industry and 
. .the report,of the-Commission of Inquiry, into the. Zimbabwe^B.eef .-Industry. (,19.81) 
has recently been released. • Figure 1 combines :two figures-’ presented in ’that 
report.. The authors compare-the rise in the average CSC-payout to beef'. 
-.producers .with the percentage offtake of cattle .from .the' peasant farming1 
areas.,■ -. They note, the rise in the numbers of cattle held in; thenpeasant ’■ 
farming areas and the inverse ratio between the level - ,f offtake and the> average 
payout to beef producers. The authors conclude from these data:
1. Herd expansion is causing severe »vergrazing and; degradation y.
' of *the .peasant farming are,as.. ,- '
2. Peasant farmers do not respond to price in determining their.. .
~ production: policy. '
. - ' 3« Thai; higher prices f«r catt.le are .-necessary ta -draw.:additional
. , sales, from the peasant farming areas. " ■ --.
: Tkis is^a .classic ease of inability e.f-pc.litcy-niakers from ;a developed 
. economy-'-to follow -the loerloai decision processes of 'the poor. ' Peasant, farmers 
•are clearly responding quickly and effectively to. beef prices. The beef animal 
is one asset to which a farmer,-living and working in r>*f niuivu.icfi- farming 
environment,^ has effective title, ..Hence it; is the-capital;and not the-produtc^ios 
value, of the^ asset- which is .of primary interest to him;. it isi capital (or . 
.numbers;’ ®f„ cat-tie) not production (percentage offtake) that is responsive to 
price. Cattle numbers and price move exactly7together except in the last ’ 
years of the .independence war when.disease^  theft' and’ violence became dominant.' 
The response .is-typical of normal economic behaviour in a situation where 
Capital.-values of 'an. asset are. increasing, rapidly- .ajid predictably.:. ■ ■ -•
,.. -Jn tbis-. instance,-the-, prescribed,„.poiicy will achieve precisely 1 •'
the. opposite of what • is intended.. A higher beef, price will stimulate; even 
greater ‘ growth in -the peasant herd, exacerbate the existing serious veld - ' 
deterioration* in., peasant. farming areas and do little to stimulate offtake from 
tbe peasant .herd. More, appropriate, suggestions., might be to .improve, the 
marketing service for -beef animal^ or. to encourage the production of other 
ruminants such as goats and sheep,; These last animals are-kept for production • 
rather than for capital. Production can--, therefore-, be expected 
'to respond to priee and marketing incentives. "An''efficiently promoted-and 
run marketing system for small- yuminants with correct price-, signals: can 
confidently be’expected to. do significantly more for peasant meat production, 
y peasant incomes and' improvement ih'-.-.y^ ld (co.jiditions than a substantial rise in 
the. price of beef.* ’ ' -;
. ..... Zimbabwe. is by no-means unique in 'failing, to introduce agricultural- 
. policies that achieve their stated objectives* Ah analysis of the performance.
• •.of Zambia1s-agricultural industries, from 1964- to 1976 .indicates-;’■ an almost. / 
tgtal failure of..government.rural development strategy.?.. ......
2-. Data in this section of the-paper are largely derived .from-Dodge D. J. (1977), 
Agricultural Policy and Performance in Zambia, Berkeley: Institute of Inter­
national' Studies. ,
6
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The gap between urban and rural incomes widened rathered than narrowed 
while cash incomes in the rural areas remained statici National food self- 
sufficienoy declined rather than improved and the economy stayed firmly 
linked to export-earnings frots' copper,"" It is’ a popular myth in Zambia that 
farmers are, and have,.been, heavily subsidised.. Again, .from this springs.- 
the-illusion that 'Za^'i'afr'fariners ao not respond'to normal economic incentives.
. The National Agricultural Marketing Board of Zambia. (NAMBOARD) received :■ •; j 
subsidies of K22 million in 1973 for a total marketed maize production of 
K33i5 million. Of this subsidy K4»77 per 90 kilegram bag of maize went f* the 
consumer while the farmer was effectively taxed by K2,14 per. bag produced.
The export parity price for maize (f.o.b, Lusaka) in 1975 was K7,52 per 
90 kilegram bag. Allowing for NAMBOARD charges, the farmer coilld have' sold , 
maize on the world market at K$,44- He, in fact, received K.4>30. Contrast, 
this with the following statement made by President Kaunda in a keynote ■ 
speech to the National Council of the United. National- independence -Party «!in 
June 1975s ’ . ,
"government, also, has subsidised foods grown at heme, .such as 
maize, where NAMBOARD's costs have been paid f#r, as well as jajfl- 
of the price paid to the farmer" - (my italics)*
The economic reality faced by the Zambian farmer was therfc of A 
’continuing and significant erosion in the terms of trade of the agricultural 
factor.-. By 1973 from selling a given quantity of production a typical Zambian 
-farmer was able to buy a consumption basket apprfximately two-thirds the si&e 
that he could purchase in 19&4. Over the, same perifd, an urban 
purchasing ability had increased by twoAthirde, In such circumstances, 
ie hardly surprising that Zambian agriculture remains a depressed and declining. 
*©cter of the economy,
A® we enter the IJBp’s, the world «c®hfmie system is faltering;.
The continuing and widening gap between the intentions #f planners and. tthe 
reality of their achievements La a serious challenge to their credibility , 
and te the welfare of national communities. Growth witk Equity is the
title ff the Zimbabwe government's development polity statement,^ In mah^ r 
ways* the proposals in that 4#sjjment mirnfr policies introduced into Western 
nations over"*the past half sentury. Minimum wages, free health care, 
environmental prfteetien and safety in the vorkplaee are amongst the welfare 
measures’ adopted by those countries in recent years. Yet today, we find 
that sane legislation being dismantled. Supply-side econfmics and■monetarism 
are becoming the trend; equity is n$ longer a primary consideration in the  ^. 
premetion of grewth policies. The cause is largely that the world is entering 
a new era ef economic scarcity. For ir^ st «f the last 50 years, developed 
countries have been able te..satisfy the increasing demands ®n their
.I^onomieso by th’e requisite expansion #f supply* - Luring the past decade,
.there has" emerged a new reality; a 1progressive inbalance between the demands 
that developed countries have planed jfn their ©e®nomies' and their ability 
to satisfy these demands, Kahn (1981) terms this the re-emergence of 
the 'economics ef scareity',-
The lesson fer Zimhabw® is that if developed-natiens have found 
.-the burden of blanket.welfare policies t#e heavy, then they are certainly 
more than our emerging economy fan bear. • But this does n&t mean a sacrifice 
of equity. Policies can bg \jgth compassionate and rational; planners can 
be idealistic in their goals and hardheadedly realistic in the means they 
adept-to achieve them. 'Kahn writess
\ - "This is the task for liberals in the 1980's - to reconcile 
our traditional aspirations with efgnemic efficiency, 
humanitarianism with the control ■c-f inflation. In the 6h©rt
run, it means exercising greater selectivity than we have in the 
? in the kinds of programmes we support and in identifying their 
intended beneficiaries. In the longer run, however, it offers the 
promise of a resumption,of economic growth, and.continued progress 
in Humanising our society. If instead we take refuge in the slogans 
and programmes of.20-50 years,ago, and.fail therefore to cope with the 
economics of scarcity, we will' not deserve .to govern."
I ' " ' '
Zimbabwe is an agricultural' country and agricultural policy will 
dominate tne performance of the national economy. The•development planner, 
with his eyes'on national goals and objectives, confronts the dilemma of 
reconciling these wixn tn^ rerl ity of micro—level decision—making. Behind 
the national .development' programme stands the farmer and his community. Successful 
rural development requires that those involved in the devising and implementing 
ihe programmes learn to forecast the changes which their proposals will bring 
about, by seeing those modifications through the eyes cf the rural people, ^both 
individually and as a social' group. Prom'the wealth of literature- on rural 
development, one salient fact emerges unchallenged? changes brought about by 
agricultural policy cannot.effectively be imposed on members of rural communities, 
th§y must be wanted. If change is needed, then the first task must be describe 
and comprehend the status quo. ' -
The rural community is"a complex but stable, system resulting from the 
interaction of a number of interdependent components'. The peasant, farmer 
needs to feed his family and live in-harmony with-the. rest of. the local" ^ 
community.,. Tradition, and his own experience.,have taught him. tho^e- fanning; 
practices'which'work,, alberit imperfectly, Vhen considering new ' approaches to 
living,.'he will ■ look. fori guidance to- the proven-leaders of his-community,
,_ rather than to the outside .planners of. whose attitudes and motivation he will, 
a-t-best*,'be suspiciousv All change brings costs as* well as benefits and, except 
in cases of severe exploitationthe-farmer-will be reluctant to-accept an 
outsider! s'evaluation of-the benefit/cost ratis to the local community. '’ ■ r
.The need then, is ...firstly to describe and then to under a-t and the 
systems which underlie the behaviour of rural communities. As agriculture "Is 
the’'predominant activity in mo'st'-rural communities,- it seems sensible to-; . 
commence- a", systematic examination of- these commdhities by describing the ■ 
individual farming systems-of which they are-composed. At the centre of each 
• "farming-^xstfera. is a farmer-who-must Apply rihe available factors, of. production 
- land, labour, capital and management - to crop, livestock or off-farm 
activities in order to meet some recognised objectives.- The enterprises 
which-he ■enh’ choose, and the factors of production to which he. has-access . 
are., defined'by. the-physical-, social and economic environment, in which he 
works arid by the technologies-' available..to.him..: From the range of1 possible 
alternatives, the farming system that emerges is only a subset selected 
' within ;'the constraints faced by'the -farmer. • -The planner must have* rehiablfe 
data on those,.constraints. He must comprehend'where the sensitive adjustment 
points' of a system lie and how. the components of the system interact. Policies 
and‘programmes can then be targeted at specific groups for defined purposes.
For agricultural policies to he both - sustainable and effective in the long 
term, the aspirations and circumstances of the farmer must be taken-adequately 
■ into account. The flaw in much rural development work is that policies are 
being applied in a vacuum,of data. There are. few'hard facts as to ,the effectiveness 
or acceptability of the various programmes devised. Rural development based 
on reliable farm data provides a sensitive and efficient means of co-ordinating 
the farming decisions made at the micr® level with the macro objectives espoused 
by development planners.
It is too easy to base policy simply on -the representations of those 
rural grorips that are well organised and accessible. The majority of farm 
families in Zi ibabwe are remote from the centres of power and lack the experience, 
confidence and opportunity "to voice their development needs. A sensitive,
9
reliable and responsive data gathering operation is essential so that the 
expressed needs of the very diverse rural population of this country can be' 
•properly addressed by national planners.
In short, it is time-that planners ceased telling the peasant x 
farmer what is good for him and his community.. ! It is time that we all stop 
to listen, to the peasant farmers "of this land.. "Pete Seeger wrote:
! s f^fihere* ds-;' ai> season.. .•... “
A time for every purpose under heaven”.
Ip is now the-time, to listen..
t
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